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Many, if not most, accounts of the financial crisis of 2008 include a prominent role for the U.S. residential mortgage market. While other U.S.
property markets, such as commercial and retail, exhibited similar boom and bust patterns, the elevated level of defaults and associated costs borne by the taxpayer have brought a particular emphasis on American single-family mortgage finance policies. It should be of little surprise that the Dodd-Frank Act contains multiple provisions related to mortgage finance. This paper offers a review of those provisions, followed by an evaluation of their likely impact and effectiveness.
Significant Mortgage Provisions
Dodd-Frank's sixteen separate titles contain a number of provisions impacting the mortgage market. The financial services law firm Davis Polk estimates that Dodd-Frank will require 49 separate rule-makings in the area of mortgage reform alone. Of particular importance are those found in titles IX, X and XIV. These three titles have the most direct impact on the mortgage market and will be the focus of this paper.
Many other provisions indirectly affect the mortgage market. By way of example, the financial stability provisions of title I could have dramatic impacts on competition in the mortgage market. Before divesting its depository subsidiary, MetLife had established a business plan to become a top 5 national mortgage originator. In order to avoid a systemic designation under DoddFrank's title I, MetLife abandoned those plans. MetLife's abandonment of the mortgage market has left mortgage origination less competitive than it would be otherwise. However, these provisions are outside the scope of this review. In general this paper will focus on the more direct impacts.
SKIN IN THE GAME
One of the more interesting approaches to risk management is Section 941's "Regulation of Credit Risk Retention", which prohibits the issuance of any assetbacked security under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") unless 1) the issuer retains "not less than 5 percent of the credit risk for any asset that is not a qualified residential mortgage" or 2) meets the definition of a qualified residential mortgage (QRM) that is to be determined by regulations jointed issued by the federal financial regulators, along with the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Securities and Exchange Commission. While Section 941's risk retention requirement applies to any asset-backed security (ABS) issued under the 1934 Act, Dodd-Frank gives broad discretion to the SEC to make such determinations for ABS that do not contain residential mortgages.
Unlike other classes of ABS, Section 941, which adds a new Section 15G to the 1934 Act, establishes a number of statutory criteria to guide the regulatory QRM definition. These statutory requirements include: 1) documentation of the borrower's financial resources; 2) debt-to-income standards; 3) mitigation of payment shock for adjustable rate products; 4) consideration of other credit enhancements; and 5) the restriction of loan terms that have been demonstrated to exhibit a higher risk of borrower default. In this initial rule regulators fleshed out a number of characteristics "that have been demonstrated to exhibit a higher risk of borrower default." The most controversial of these has been a minimum 20 percent required down-payment.
While there is little, if any debate, over the contribution of lower down-payments to default behavior, comments submitted to the regulators, from financial firms and advocacy groups, claim that such a requirement would dramatically reduce mortgage access to low income and minority households. Commentators have also observed that Dodd-Frank's Section 941 is silent on the issue of downpayment. In response regulators issued a new proposed rule on August 28, 2013.
The new proposal solicits comments on either no down-payment requirement or a higher 30 percent requirement, dropping the original 20 percent requirement. It is widely expected that commentators will support the elimination of any downpayment requirement and that regulators will accordingly offer a final rule with no limitations on loan-to-value.
Also of interest are the QRM's requirements for debt-to-income ratios.
The initial rule sets a maximum front-end ratio of 28% and a back-end ratio of 36%, which are consistent with the ratios generally observed in the conventional mortgage market although stricter than those observed in FHA.
The final QRM rule will possess the potential to dramatically shape the characteristics of which loans may or may not be sold into the public secondary markets. As the QRM is also an amendment to the 1934 Act, MBS issues that are later determined to be non-QRM would subject the issuer to liability under SEC Rule 10b-5. Given the subjectivity in some of the documentation requirements under QRM and potential Rule 10b-5 liability, lenders can expect increased documentation and verification costs.
DODD-FRANK AND "PREDATORY LENDING"
One narrative of the financial crisis attributes the increase in mortgage defaults to "predatory lending". Dodd-Frank's attempt to address predatory lending is contained in title XIV, also labeled the "Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Table 1 Dodd-Frank's Section 1401 expands the definition of "mortgage originator" while also adding new requirements for persons falling under such definition. A "mortgage originator" under Section 1401 is defined to be a person "who, for direct or indirect compensation or gain, or in the expectation of direct or indirect compensation or gain -(i) takes a residential mortgage loan application;
(ii) assists a consumer in obtaining or applying to obtain a residential mortgage loan; or (iii) offers or negotiates terms of a residential mortgage loan." Although the Act contains exceptions to this definition, the impact will mean that all mortgage brokers and many bank employees, other than administrative and clerical, will be considered mortgage originators and hence subject to both enforcement and litigation risk.
Once one falls under the "mortgage originator" definition a variety of duties and restrictions apply, including the requirement to be qualified and licensed under the "SAFE Act". Dodd-Frank also prohibits the compensation of originators varying based upon the terms of the loans, other than based on the principal amount. Originators may only receive compensation from a party other than the borrower in instances where the borrower pays nothing to the originator as well as not paying any upfront fees or points. Originators can, however, continue to be compensated on the volume of loans closed. The intent of these restrictions is to limit the incentive of originators to place borrowers in higher cost loans.
A recurring theme in Dodd-Frank's mortgage reforms is the assumption that many borrowers were simply in the "wrong" loan. Along this line of thinking, mortgage originators are prohibited from "steering" borrowers toward loans under which the borrower lacks a reasonable ability to pay or that have certain features. Originators are also prohibited from mischaracterizing either the credit history of the borrower or their loan options. The intent here reflects a belief that many prime borrowers were "steered" into subprime products. In general, originators placing borrowers into "qualified mortgages" (QM) will be protected from enforcement and liability.
On January 10, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued final rules implementing Dodd-Frank's Title XIV Subtitle B, more commonly known as the "Qualified Mortgage" Rule. As the QM rules amends the Truth in Lending Act, violations of the QM that fall outside its safe harbor subject lenders to significant liability. Delinquent borrowers can also use violations of the QM rule as a defense to foreclosure proceedings.
The heart of the QM standards are found in Section 1411's "ability to pay" requirements. Section 1411 prohibits lenders from a making residential mortgage unless the lender makes a good faith determination that the borrower has a reasonable ability to repay the loan. While Section 1411 does provide some guidance on what constitutes a "good faith determination" and what is "reasonable," most details are left to the CFPB. Even under the currentlyproposed ability-to-pay rule, considerable discretion remains in interpreting these terms. Due to concerns over the lack of clarity in the ability-to-pay standard, Dodd-Frank's Section 1412 allows for the creation of a safe harbor from liability if lenders meet the definition of a qualified mortgage. It is in minimizing liability risk that lenders will attempt to meet the standards for a qualified mortgage.
Lender compliance with the "ability to pay" requirements are likely to be both costly and extensive. What data is to be collected? How is that data audited?
How long is it stored? How does the originator create a clear audit trail that can be shared and verified by both servicers and investors? These are all difficult and subjective questions where the cost of being wrong will be significant. Ultimately these compliance costs will be passed along to borrowers, mostly likely in the form of higher rate spreads.
Similar to the QRM, the statutory restrictions on QM ban certain mortgage features, such as interest only, balloon payments and negative amortization.
Section 1412 also limits points and fees to no more than 3 percent of the loan amount. For ARMs, Section 1412 requires loans to underwritten at the maximum possible rate during the first five years of the loan. Loan terms may not exceed 30 years. Income and financial resources must be fully documented. The CFPB is to establish maximum debt to income ratios for qualified mortgages as well. Dodd-Frank's title XIV contains additional prohibitions that go beyond its ability-to-pay requirements. Specifically Section 1414 severely limits the use of prepayment penalties, prohibiting them for non-QM loans and capping their amount and duration for QM loans. Despite the increased liability from title XIV, or perhaps because of, lenders are prohibited from requiring mandatory arbitration for all residential mortgages. Even if such did not increase liability costs, it is likely to increase the variance of liability costs. Section 1414 also requires lenders to make borrowers aware of their ability to "walk away" in anti-deficiency states. Section 1417 increases civil money penalties under the Truth in Lending Act, of which both QM and HOEPA are part.
Title X of Dodd-Frank creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Enforcement and implementation of most pre-existing mortgage regulation, including that under the Truth in Lending Act, the SAFE Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, transfers to the CFPB. This new agency is given considerable authority to re-write existing rules, as well as given responsibility for policing unfair and deceptive practices in the mortgage market. Dodd-Frank also adds a new category of "abusive" practices, yet to be defined by the CFPB. Whereas HUD and the Federal Reserve were the primary federal regulators in the area of mortgage finance, CFPB will now take their place. There is a strong expectation that CFPB will be a more aggressive regulator than was either HUD or the Federal Reserve.
Impact of Dodd-Frank on Mortgage Availability
A goal of the Dodd-Frank Act is to eliminate certain products and practices from the mortgage market. So at a very basic level the choices facing mortgage borrowers will be reduced, the difficult question is in gauging how much.
At least three independent attempts have been made to estimate the impact of QRM and/or QM on mortgage availability. These three analyses were performed by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), the peaked at 15 percent of the subprime market. As longer loan terms allow borrowers to make higher house price bids while maintaining a constant monthly payment, the growth in this market segment likely reflected a last ditch attempt by some subprime borrowers to purchase before the boom was over. Some amount of these loans may have reflected an attempt to re-finance into lower monthly payments. Given the relatively small share of mortgages with durations over 30 years this Dodd-Frank restriction will also likely be quite minor. It may also signal the end, or at least a long pause, in the decades long push to extend maturity as an avenue for increasing "affordability". There is some irony in the federal government historically leading the charge to extend maturity now taking the position that mortgage maturities should be no more than 30 years. Both the QM and QRM place restrictions upon borrower documentation, particularly in the area of income. A common concern is that no-or lowdocumentation loans lead to greater levels of fraud and higher losses in the mortgage market than would have occurred otherwise. Whereas the QRM is an obstacle for securitization, the QM standards come with substantial and uncertain liability, so while there is likely to be a market for non-QRM loans; non-QM loans will become rare. According the option of simply holding no-or lowdocumentation loans on portfolio is not likely to be an attractive option for lenders. By GAO's estimates, the percentage of subprime loans lacking full Loans that do not meet the QRM requirements can still be securitized, with the caveat that the issuers must retain not less than 5 percent of the credit risk of the securitized asset pool. Issuers are also prohibited from hedging or otherwise transferring this risk. The proposed QRM rule, which was re-issued for comment on August 28, 2013, offers a number of options for determining the 5 percent retention. The most obvious would be a 5 percent "first-loss" where the issuer bears the first 5 percent of loss. Other options include a 5 percent prorated share of total losses, in which issuers retained 5 percent of each class of ABS under the transaction, or a so-called "vertical" risk retention. Only in cases of 100 percent loss would such equal the 5 percent first loss framework. Questions have also been raised as to whether risk retention should be calculated on a fair value basis. While regulators could ultimately go above 5 percent retention, such appears unlikely. Ultimately the greater risk from the QRM is likely to be liability under the securities laws rather than the retention of a sliver of credit risk.
Press reports at the time of the August 2013 re-issue indicate that regulators may abandon any downpayment requirement for the QRM and harmonize the QRM rule to mirror the QM. Dodd-Frank requires regulators to establish a QRM standard that is "no broader" than the QM standard. This is some question as to whether "broader" means that the set of QRM complaint loans is greater or smaller than the set of QM compliant loans. At least one legal expert (Natter 2012) has argued that "broader" eliminates the ability of regulators "to have a more inclusive definition of QRM" than of QM. In all likelihood regulators will solve this issue by having a QRM and QM rule that are largely mirrors, in terms of loans eligible. Such would result in having no minimum downpayment requirements.
Impact of Dodd-Frank on Mortgage Default
The Dodd-Frank Act is a response to the theory that "bad" mortgage lending and lenders drove borrowers into default, which ultimately drove the housing market into decline leading to a fall in the value of mortgage-backed securities, resulting in a panic among the holders of mortgage-backed securities. Setting aside that national house prices reached an inflection point almost a year before the inflection point in defaults, one measure of the effectiveness of Dodd-Frank's mortgage rules will be to what extent does it reduce mortgage defaults. 
Marginal Impact on Default Probability
Non-Prime Purchase Mortgage Table 2 Despite having the largest impact on the number of loans, the proposed Increasing borrower FICO by one-standard-deviation, or about 74 points, decreasing default probability by around seven times as much as switching from an ARM to fixed rate. A 74 point increase in FICO also has over twice the impact of moving from a no/low to full documentation low. Both GAO and Bajari, Chu and Park also find the impact of housing price changes to be magnitudes higher than the provisions of the QM/QRM rule.
If the down-payment requirements of the proposed QRM rule are abandoned, the remaining changes are likely to have modest impacts on default probabilities. The biggest impact would be from the full documentation requirements and the cap on DTI. These two changes combined, however, are projected to lower default probabilities by around 1 percentage point. Kleiner (2009) finds that states with more stringent licensing requirements for mortgage brokers actually witnessed higher levels of mortgage default. The hypothesis is that increased barriers to entry reduce underwriting efforts to such an extent that off-sets any improvements in broker quality that result from the licensing scheme. Kleiner's results raise the possibility that Dodd-Frank's Section 1401 originator requirements, coupled with the SAFE Act, actually increase mortgage defaults rather than reduce them, as the statute intends.
The barely noticeable reduction in projected defaults could be more than off-set by Dodd-Frank's impact on the foreclosure process. As noted, Dodd- 
